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Notes and Comments
Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.: Is
Employment in New York Still at Will?
I. Introduction
Under the employment-at-will rule' as it developed in the
United States, an employee hired for an unspecified term is free
to quit his employment at any time for any reason.' His em-
ployer, similarly, can fire him at any time for good cause, bad
cause or no cause at all.4 The employment-at-will rule was well
suited to the industrializing nation in which it developed,5 and
1. The employment-at-will rule originally developed in England. Under the English
version of the rule, a hiring for an unspecified time was considered to be a hiring for a
year, unless there was a custom relating to the subject and a contract was made with
reference to it. See Watson v. Gugino, 204 N.Y. 535, 540, 98 N.E. 18, 20 (1912). See also
C. LABATT, MAsTER AND SnvANrr § 156, at 504-05 (2d ed. 1913); Note, Implied Contract
Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. Ray. 335, 340 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Job Secur-
ity]. For a general discussion of the English employment-at-will rule see LABATT, supra,
§§ 156, 157.
2. American law on employment-at-will departed from English law during the latter
part of the 19th century. LABATT, supra note 1, § 159. For a general discussion of the
American employment-at-will rule see Feinman, The Development of the Employment
at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 118 (1976); Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will:
Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329 (1982); Job Security, supra
note 1.
3. Watson v. Gugino, 204 N.Y. 535, 541, 98 N.E. 18, 20 (1912).
4. See Blumrosen, Workers' Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice Fran-
cis-A Judge for Our Season, 24 RuTGrS L. Rsv. 480, 481 (1970); Murg & Scharman,
supra note 2, at 329; Job Security, supra note 1, at 335.
Clearly an employer subject to federal and state employment discrimination laws,
e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980) providing protection against discharges based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin, cannot discharge an employee in violation of such statutes. The effect
of such statutory limitations on the employment-at-will rule is beyond the scope of this
Note.
5. The adoption of the employment-at-will rule was prompted by the economic real-
ities of the United States during its period of industrialization. Murg & Scharman, supra
note 2, at 335. Laissez-faire and free enterprise were the dominant economic philosophies
of the time. Job Security, supra note 1, at 343. The ability of the employer to determine
1
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was harmonious with the philosophical underpinnings of con-
tract law at the time.6 The changing complexion of society, how-
ever, has led to discontent with the rule and agitation for its
modification, which in turn has led to the creation of a number
the size of his work force was considered essential. Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at
336, 340.
6. Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at 335. The employment-at-will rule conformed
to the principles of contract law that existed during the period of its development, i.e.,
mutuality of obligation, mutuality of remedies, and mutuality of consideration. Id. See
also Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Ex-
ercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1419-21 (1967). The principle of
mutuality of obligation provides that both parties to a contract must be bound or neither
is. IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152, at 2 (1963). "[Ejach party is under a legal
duty to the other; each has made a promise and each is an obligor." Id. at 4. An em-
ployer could not be bound to continue the employment of an employee when the em-
ployee was free to quit at any time. Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at 336; Blades,
supra at 1419. "Therefore, the courts concluded that if the employee ... was not obli-
gated to continue to provide his services, the employer similarly should not be obligated
to continue to provide employment." Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at 336-37. See
also Blades, supra, at 1419.
Under the theory of mutuality of remedy, a court will not grant specific performance
to one party to a contract unless the other party also could have obtained specific per-
formance. See 5A A. ComIN, COR IN ON CORACTS § 1180, at 330 (1964) "The remedy of
specific performance is an extraordinary remedy developed in Courts of Equity to pro-
vide relief when the legal remedies of damages and restitution are inadequate. A decree
for specific performance takes the form of a decree ordering a party affirmatively to carry
out his contractual duties or enjoining him from violating the contract." J. CALAMARI &
J. PERULo, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 2d § 16-1 (1977). Contracts for personal services are
almost never specifically enforced, CoRBIN, supra, § 1204, at 398, because of courts' dis-
like of enforcing such decrecs and of forcing people to work together in close personal
association. Id. at 401. Furthermore, forcing an employee to work for an employer is
generally considered a form of involuntary servitude in violation of the thirteenth
amendment. Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at 336; CORBIN, supra, § 1204, at 401;
CALAMARI & PERRILLO, supra, § 16-5, at 585. Therefore, to force an employer to retain an
employee would be to grant specific performance to an employee when the same remedy
was not available to the employer.
The principle of consideration also supported the employment-at-will doctrine.
Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at 335-36. See also Blades, supra, at 1419-20. "The
essence of consideration, then, is legal detriment that has been bargained for and ex-
changed for the promise." CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra, § 4-1, at 134-35 (footnote omit-
ted). The employee provided his labor as consideration for his pay. Murg & Scharman,
supra note 2, at 337; Job Security, supra note 1, at 351-52. The willingness of an em-
ployee to come to work and to perform the services required of him was not considered
adequate consideration to bind his employer to continue his employment. See id. Unless
the employee provided some additional consideration beyond mere performance of his
duties, the courts found that there was no consideration provided for continued employ-
ment. Id.
7. See Blades, supra note 6, at 1435; Feerick, Employment at Will, N.Y.L.J., Nov.
2, 1979, at 1, col. 1; Feerick, Employment-At-Will Rule and Unjust Dismissal, N.Y.L.J.,
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of exceptions to the at-will rule.8
New York courts have recognized that under certain cir-
cumstances the actions of the parties can convert what would
have been an employment-at-will into one with greater contrac-
tual rights for the employee, such as in the case of a collective
bargaining agreement providing that employees would not be
discharged without cause.9 Nonetheless, New York has lagged
behind other states in modifying the at-will rule, 10 and as a re-
sult, employees who believe they have been unfairly fired have
had little success in the New York courts.11
A case recently decided by the New York Court of Appeals
may signal a move away from New York's rigid adherence to the
employment-at-will rule. In Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.,12 a
former employee, believing he had been fired without just cause
in derogation of stated company policy sued his former em-
ployer.13 The issue as stated by the court was whether the plain-
tiff, employed for an unspecified term, had pleaded a good cause
of action for breach of contract against his employer where he
Aug. 6, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
8. For example, the existence of a definite term of employment would limit the em-
ployer's right to discharge during the term to just cause. Murg & Scharman, supra note
2, at 356. Furthermore, the rule is occasionally not applied where the discharge violates
public policy. Id. Finally, when an employee gives consideration in addition to merely
performing his job, his employment will not be at will. Id.
9. Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959). In
Parker, a case involving a discharged union employee, the court recognized that although
the plaintiff's contract of employment "standing alone . . . was terminable at will, and
would not give rise to a cause of action," id. at 159, 156 N.E.2d at 298, 182 N.Y.S.2d at
579, "[t]he collective bargain. . . provides that 'No regular employee shall be discharged
or disciplined without good and sufficient cause."' Id. at 160, 156 N.E.2d. at 299, 182
N.Y.S.2d at 580.
10. For example, California has recognized the tort of abusive discharge. See infra
notes 24-27 and accompanying text. California and Michigan have recognized that docu-
ments such as employee handbooks and policy manuals can create contractual rights.
See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1979), affd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed,
51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980); Marinzulich v. National Bank
of N. Am., N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1979, at 10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May 8, 1979),
aff'd, 73 A.D.2d 886, 423 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't 1980); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d
791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028
(1979).
12. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
13. Id. at 460-61, 443 N.E.2d at 442-43, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194-95.
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was allegedly "discharged without the 'just and sufficient cause'
or the rehabilitative efforts specified in the employer's personnel
handbook and allegedly promised at the time he accepted the
employment."1 4 Although similar suits had been dismissed in
the past for failure to state a claim, 8 the court held that the
record contained "sufficient evidence of a contract and a breach
to sustain a cause of action."'
Part II of this Note discusses the background of the em-
ployment-at-will rule as it developed in New York. Part III
presents the facts and lower court decisions in Weiner v. Mc-
Graw-Hill, Inc. Part IV presents the court of appeals decision
and Part V analyzes it. This Note concludes that the court of
appeals, while not abandoning the employment-at-will rule, did
modify it by allowing Weiner a chance to prove the existence of
a contract and its breach. Although the court's decision was cor-
rect given the facts of the case, this Note criticizes its inade-
quate treatment of the statute of frauds issue and its failure to
justify its departure from precedent. Finally, in Part VI, this
Note speculates on the impact of Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.
on New York law.
II. Legal Background
The employment-at-will rule was articulated in New York
in 1895 in Martin v. New York Life Insurance Co.'7 Martin es-
tablished the principle that a hiring for an unspecified term is a
hiring at will with either side at liberty to terminate at any
time.1 8 Since Martin, the New York courts have been reluctant
to recognize causes of action sounding in either tort or contract
14. Id. at 460, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
15. See supra note 11.
16. Id. at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
17. 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895). In Martin, the plaintiff had been hired for a
yearly salary to be paid monthly. After being fired during the year he claimed that he
was entitled to a full year's pay. Id. at 119, 42 N.E. at 417. The court did not accept
plaintiff's contention that he had a contract of employment for a year, id. at 120, 42 N.E.
at 417, stating that a "contract to pay one $2500 a year for services is not a contract for a
year, but a contract to pay at the rate of $2500 a year for services actually rendered, and
is determinable at will by either party." Id. at 121, 42 N.E. at 417 (quoting H. WOOD,
MASTER AND SERVANT § 136 (2d ed.)).
18. Id. at 121, 42 N.E. at 417.
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by discharged employees.19 Tort claims have failed because New
York, unlike some states, has not yet recognized the tort of abu-
sive discharge, 20 and because the elements of a prima facie tort
usually cannot be established in an employment situation.2 1 The
statute of frauds has been a barrier to contract causes of ac-
tion,22 as has the courts' unwillingness to recognize contractual
rights as being created by documents such as employee hand-
books and policy manuals.2 3
A. Tort Theories of Liability
1. The tort of abusive discharge
The tort of abusive discharge "provides a cause of action for
employees who are discharged for engaging in certain activities
which are protected as a matter of public policy,"24 such as en-
gaging in union activities, 25 or refusing to commit perjury26 or to
19. See, e.g., Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1979), afl'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed,
51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d
791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028
(1979).
20. See supra cases cited in note 19.
21. Marinzulich v. National Bank of N. Am., N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1979, at 10, col. 2
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May 8, 1979), aff'd, 73 A.D.2d 886, 423 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't
1980); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 48
N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979).
22. Weisse v. Engelhard Minerals and Chem. Corp., 571 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1978);
Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Edwards v. Citibank,
N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), affd, 74 A.D.2d
553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (lst Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433
N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980).
23. Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1979), a/f'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (lst Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51
N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d 791,
416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979).
24. Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at 344. Public policy has been described as
"that principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a ten-
dency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. . . ." Petermann v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (2d Dist. Div. 2 1959).
25. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (2d
Dist. Div. 1 1980).
26. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d
19831
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participate in an illegal scheme.2 7 To bring a cause of action suc-
cessfully in abusive discharge, a plaintiff must persuade the
court that there is a public policy of the state and that by firing
him the defendant has violated it.2s Under the theory of abusive
discharge, "the interest of the employer in the exercise of his
unfettered right to terminate an employee under a contract at
will is balanced against the interest of the community in uphold-
ing its laws and public policy. '"29
The New York courts have been reluctant to recognize the
tort of abusive discharge, although they have hinted that they
may be willing to do so in the appropriate case.30 In Chin v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,3 (AT&T), plaintiff al-
leged that he had been discharged in violation of public policy
by his employer, AT&T, after he was arrested for driving a van
into three police officers during a political demonstration.3 2 He
brought a complaint against AT&T under three theories: breach
of contract, prima facie tort, and abusive discharge.33 In support
of his claim of abusive discharge, Chin alleged that his discharge
was politically motivated.34 Since Chin had proceeded under a
cause of action not yet recognized in New York," the supreme
court at special term dismissed his complaint yet indicated that
it was not averse to recognizing new causes of action when war-
ranted. 6 The court noted that a substantial showing would have
to be made that there was a public policy of the state which had
25 (2d Dist. Div. 2 1959).
27. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d
1330 (1980).
28. Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1075, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 741
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal
denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979).
29. Id. at 1075, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
30. Id. at 1075, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 741. See also Marinzulich v. National Bank of N.
Am., N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1979, at 10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May 8, 1979), aff'd, 73
A.D.2d 886, 423 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't 1980).
31. 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70
A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d
1028 (1979).
32. Id. at 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
33. Id. at 1072, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1075, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
36. Id. at 1075, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
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been violated by the defendant when he fired the plaintiff.8 7
Chin had not sustained his burden of showing that a public pol-
icy existed in New York which "would restrict the right of a pri-
vate employer to discharge an employee at will due to the em-
ployee's political beliefs, activities and associations."3 8 The
court, however, did not say what would constitute the "substan-
tial showing" necessary to sustain a cause of action in abusive
discharge. It also dismissed Chin's other two causes of action
pursuant to section 3211(a)(7) of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules (CPLR) for failing to state a cause of action.39
The following year, another employee discharged by his em-
ployer brought an action in breach of contract, abusive discharge
and prima facie tort. In Marinzulich v. National Bank of North
America,40 the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged for hav-
ing uncovered evidence of embezzlement. 41 He claimed that by
discharging him for his honesty, the bank had violated the pub-
lic policy of the state of encouraging the discovery of crimes.42
Again, the trial court pointed out that a cause of action in abu-
sive discharge had not yet been recognized in New York and
that the allegations set forth in Marinzulich's motion did not
warrant the court's making new law.43 The court once more de-
clined to indicate what allegations would be sufficient to sustain
such a cause of action.
Similarly, in Edwards v. Citibank, N.A.,44 the trial court
dismissed plaintiff's cause of action in abusive discharge as not
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1076, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
Rule 3211. Motion to dismiss
(a) Motion to dismiss cause of action. A party may move for judgment dis-
missing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that:
7. the pleading fails to state a cause of action ...
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 3211(a)(7) (McKinney 1970).
40. N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1979, at 10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May 8, 1979), af'd,
73 A.D.2d 886, 423 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't 1980).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), aff'd, 74 A.D.2d
553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433
N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980).
1983]
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actionable under New York law." Edwards claimed he was dis-
charged for having uncovered evidence of illegal foreign currency
manipulations. ' He alleged one contract and two tort causes of
action against his employer, Citibank.7 The appellate division
unanimously affirmed the dismissal of the abusive discharge
cause of action without further discussion.8
Although the New York courts have not recognized the tort
of abusive discharge based on a violation of public policy, several
decisions have indicated a willingness to do so given the proper
case.49 This was the interpretation of a federal district court sit-
ting in New York in Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc.50 The court
pointed to a national trend toward recognizing this tort and
cited Chin as an indication that New York was also arguably
prepared to do so."' The court in Savodnik observed that the
Chin court had not only indicated its acceptance of the general
doctrine, but had articulated the component elements of such a
claim." It noted that the Chin court had "virtually invited rec-
ognition of such law by stating, in otherwise unnecessary dicta,
that 'this court is not averse to recognizing new causes of action
. . . where clearly warranted.' "" The court determined that the
Chin court granted the motion to dismiss the abusive discharge
claim, not because it was unwilling to recognize such a tort, but
because the plaintiff had not sustained his burden of persua-
sion.54 The court believed that even without the trend toward
recognizing this tort, New York courts would allow Savodnik's
case to proceed given the facts" which suggested that the defe-
45. Id. at 61, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
46. Id. at 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
47. Id.
48. Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal
dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980).
49. See Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d at 1075, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 741;
Marinsulich v. National Bank of N. Am., N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1979, at 10, col. 2.
50. 488 F. Supp. 822, 825 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 826.
53. Id. (citing Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d at 1075, 410 N.Y.S.2d
at 741).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 827. Savodnik had worked for defendant for over 13 years. He received
frequent promotions and salary increases. Part of the compensation he was to receive
was a pension, the rights of which were to vest after 15 years. Defendant then sought to
[Vol. 3:245
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dant's conduct had been unconscionable." Defendant's motion
to dismiss the abusive discharge cause of action was therefore
denied. 7
2. Prima facie tort
Employees who believe they have been wrongfully dis-
charged sometimes allege a prima facie tort as well as the spe-
cific tort of abusive discharge." A "prima facie tort is the inflic-
tion of intentional harm, resulting in damage, without excuse or
justification, by an act or series of acts which would otherwise be
lawful."5' The motive must be exclusively malicious;60 for exam-
ple, the tortfeasor cannot have acted out of business motives."'
Discharged employees frequently have difficulty proving this ele-
ment of maliciousness in a wrongful discharge situation since al-
legations that an employer was motivated by personal gain62 or
business considerations' s are inconsistent with an exclusively
malicious intent. If, for instance, the employer thought he could
avoid its responsibility to contribute to the Plan by discharging Savodnik. Id. at 825-26.
56. Id. at 826.
57. Id. at 827. The following year in Hovey v. Lutheran Medical Center, 516 F.
Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), a federal district court refused to dismiss the case of a dis-
charged medical employee. Id. at 558. Hovey, 62 years old, was fired after six and a half
years on the job. Id. at 555. The court cited Chin as an indication of New York's willing-
ness to recognize a tort of abusive discharge. Id. at 557. The case was similar to Savodnik
in that Hovey alleged that his employer was trying to deprive him of his pension bene-
fits. Id. at 558. According to the federal court, the integrity of pension benefits was a
public policy in New York. Id.
58. See, e.g., Chin v. American Tel. & TeL Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), af'd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal
denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979); Marinzulich v. National Bank of N.
Am., N.Y.L.J. May 10, 1979, at 10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, May 8, 1979), afl'd, 73
A.D.2d 886, 423 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't 1980).
59. Carnival Co. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 23 A.D.2d 75, 78, 258 N.Y.S.2d 110,
113 (1st Dep't 1965) (citing Ruza v. Ruza, 286 A.D. 767, 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1st
Dep't 1955)).
60. Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), affd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal
denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979).
61. Id. at 1074, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
62. Wegman v. Dairylea Coop., Inc., 50 A.D.2d 108, 114, 376 N.Y.S.2d 728, 735 (4th
Dep't 1975).
63. See, e.g., Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1074, 410 N.Y.S.2d
737, 740 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), affd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't),
appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979).
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run his business more profitably without the employee, arguably,
his motives for firing the employee would not be purely
malicious.
In Chin v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,s4 the
plaintiff brought a second cause of action in prima facie tort,
alleging that his discharge was maliciously motivated.6 5 The trial
court found, however, that the allegations in his complaint were
conclusory and not sufficient to establish such a cause of ac-
tion." Even if the allegations constituted sufficient evidence of
malice, plaintiff had not shown that AT&T was not also moti-
vated by legitimate purposes or by business considerations.6 7
The court pointed out that to establish a prima facie tort, malice
must be the only motive." Defendant submitted affidavits estab-
lishing that it dismissed Chin, after he drove a van into three
police officers during a political demonstration, due to its con-
cern for its business, its reputation and for the safety of its cus-
tomers and employees." The court dismissed Chin's cause of ac-
tion 7 0 noting that this type of motive is inconsistent with the
strictly malicious motive necessary to establish a prima facie
tort.
71
B. Breach of Contract
1. The statute of frauds
The employee hired for an indefinite period typically has no
written contract. Claims of the existence of an oral contract for
permanent employment may be barred by New York's statute of
64. 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), afl'd, 70
A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d
1028 (1979).
65. Id. at 1072, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
66. Id. at 1074, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1076, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
71. Id. at 1074, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 740. See also Marinzulich v. National Bank of N.
Am., N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1979, at 10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May S, 1979), alf'd, 73
A.D.2d 886, 423 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't 1980), where the court dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint alleging a prima facie tort by merely observing that the allegation was fatally
defective in as much as such an action would not lie where employment was terminable
at will.
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frauds. 2 Under the statute, an agreement which by its terms is
not to be performed within one year from its making is unen-
forceable unless in writing and signed by the party to be
charged.73 The purpose of the provision is to avoid the leaving to
memory the terms of a contract which is longer than a year.74
New York courts have interpreted this provision narrowly to
give effect to oral agreements where there is any possibility of
performance within one year even though the likelihood of such
performance is remote.7 5 Generally, only those contracts which
are by their terms incapable of performance within a year are
barred.7' For instance, when part of a two-part bonus to induce
an employee to join a company is to be paid in the second year
of employment, one court has held the unwritten contract to be
incapable of performance within a year and thus barred by the
statute of frauds.7 On the other hand, employment agreements
in which either side is free to terminate at any time are usually
considered hirings at will capable of performance within a year
and thus not within the statute of frauds. 8
72. N.Y. GaR. OBLio. LAw § 5-701(a)(1)(McKinney Supp. 1982).
73. New York's statute of frauds relating to contracts not to be performed within a
year reads as follows:
a. Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some note or
memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or undertaking:
1. By its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making
thereof or the performance of which is not to be completed before the end of a
lifetime;
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. Law § 5-701(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
74. 2 A. CosBN, CoRMN ON Coa'rAcs § 444, at 534 (1950). "Where actions on con-
tracts are long delayed, injustice is likely to be done because of bad memory and because
witnesses have died or moved away, so that mistakes will be made and perjury is more
likely to be successful. And in the case of a contract whose performance is to cover a long
period of time, actions are likely to be long delayed." Id.
75. See, e.g., Weisse v. Engelhard Minerals and Chem. Corp., 571 F.2d 117, 119 (2d
Cir. 1978); North Shore Bottling Co. v. Schmidt & Sons, 22 N.Y.2d 171, 175-76, 239
N.E.2d 189, 191, 292 N.Y.S.2d 86, 89-90 (1968); 56 N.Y. Jun. Statute of Frauds § 15
(1967).
76. 56 N.Y. Jun. Statute of Frauds § 15 (1967).
77. Weisse v. Engelhard Minerals and Chem. Corp., 571 F.2d 117, 119 (2d Cir. 1978).
78. 56 N.Y. Jun. Statute of Frauds § 38 (1967). But see Edwards v. Citibank, N.A.,
100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), afl'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425
N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 876, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433
N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980), where plaintiff claimed that his employment of indefinite duration
was terminable by him at any time, but terminable by Citibank for just cause only. Id. at
60, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 270. The court rejected this theory, holding that the employment
11
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The 1892 case of Blake v. Voight79 established the rule in
New York that if a contract has as one of its terms a bilateral
option to terminate within a year it is considered capable of per-
formance within a year and thus not within the operation of the
statute of frauds.80 When such an option to terminate is unilat-
eral, its effect is less clear. Although one court could see no dif-
ference between unilateral and bilateral options to terminate as
far as the statute of frauds was concerned,81 other courts have
viewed the distinction as controlling. In Harris v. Home Indem-
nity Co.,82 for instance, the court said that the rule in Blake
should not be extended to make enforceable an oral agreement
for permanent employment, where the right to cancel or termi-
nate is limited unilaterally to plaintiff. For in such cases defen-
dant's liability endures indefinitely, subject only to the uncon-
trolled voluntary act of the party who seeks to hold defendant.
Under such circumstances it is illusory, from the point of view of
defendant, to consider the contract terminable or performable
within one year.es
Thus, when an oral employment agreement is for an unspecified
period the applicabililty of the statute of frauds depends on
whether the court interprets the agreement as being capable of
performance within a year. " In Belfert v. Peoples Planning
agreement was terminable at any time, for any reason by either party. Id. Under such an
interpretation the contract certainly could have been completed within a year. Neverthe-
less, the court, in dealing with the statute of frauds issue, merely stated that "an oral
contract of the form urged by plaintiff [was] violative of the Statute of Frauds, since
performance was not to have been completed within one year." Id.
79. 134 N.Y. 69, 31 N.E. 256 (1892).
80. Id. at 72-73, 31 N.E. at 256-57. When permission to terminate is a term of the
contract, termination is not destruction but performance. Id. at 72, 31 N.E. at 256. Ter-
mination does not defeat the contract, but simply advances the period of fulfillment. Id.
at 73, 31 N.E. at 257.
81. Raymond Spector Co. v. Serutan Co., 60 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County), afl'd, 270 A.D. 993, 63 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1st Dep't 1946).
82. 6 A.D.2d 861, 175 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1st Dep't 1958).
83. Id. at 861, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 604. See also Supplee v. Hallanan, 14 Misc. 2d 658,
179 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), where plaintiff had an oral agreement for
lifetime employment with a unilateral option to cancel within a year. Id. at 658, 179
N.Y.S.2d at 726. Her claim was dismissed because, following the holding of Harris, a
unilateral option for the plaintiff did not remove the bar of the statute of frauds. Id. at
659, 179 N.Y.S.2d at 727.
84. A narrow reading of the statute seems to frustrate its purpose. See supra note
73 and text accompanying note 74. If an agreement does not contain an explicit term
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Corp. of America,s where plaintiff had the option to renew his
contract at the end of a year and defendant had the right to
terminate for cause at the end of a year,86 the rule in Harris on
unilateral options was followed.87 Since defendant could not dis-
charge plaintiff after a year with impunity unless the discharge
was for cause, the court reasoned that there was no bilateral op-
tion.88 Termination for cause was considered destruction of the
contract, not performance or termination. 9
2. Contract rights created by company documents
In cases where they have no written employment contracts,
discharged employees have tried to convince the courts that doc-
uments such as employee handbooks and policy manuals prom-
ising job security can create contractual rights in what would
otherwise be employments at will.90 Many employees, in addi-
tion to receiving oral representations that their employments
will not be terminated except for just cause, receive written rep-
which makes it incapable of performance within a year, courts generally consider it capa-
ble of such performance and thus not within the statute. If the parties contemplate that
the employment agreement will last indefinitely, however, it is likely that an action for
breach will be brought years after the agreement is made when memories are no longer
fresh. This is the very mischief the statute was designed to prevent.
For a discussion of the inconsistent approach which New York courts have taken in
deciding whether a contract was capable of performance within a year, see Note, 1956-57
Legislature: Problems Left Uncorrected, 26 FORD. L. REV. 372, 385-88 (1957).
85. 22 Misc. 2d 753, 199 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959), aff'd, 11 A.D.2d
760, 202 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1st Dep't 1960), afj'd, 11 N.Y.2d 755, 181 N.E.2d 630, 226
N.Y.S.2d 693 (1962).
86. Id. at 754, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
87. Id. at 755-56, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
88. Id. at 756, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
89. Id. at 755-56, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 842. The court rejected the contention that there
was a distinction relevant to the applicability of the statute of frauds between an option
to renew and an option to terminate. "If either of such options is in plaintiff alone, the
result is the same and if the agreement is oral and no existing writing evidences the
agreement, it is unenforceable." Id. at 757, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 843. "[I]f the option is
bilteral or in the defendant, the agreement is performable within a year regardless of
whether the option is to renew or to terminate." Id.
90. See, e.g., Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc 2d 1070, 1072, 410 N.Y.S.2d
737, 739 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), affd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't),
appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979); Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100
Misc. 2d 59, 60, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), aff'd, 74 A.D.2d 553,
425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433
N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980).
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resentations to the same effect. Several states have recognized
such documents as creating contractual rights."' New York, how-
ever, has not followed their lead, labeling such handbooks noth-
ing more than "broad internal policy guidelines"92 that do not
create contractual rights. For example, in Chin v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,es plaintiff had been given the
91. In a California case, Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 443, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722 (2d Dist. Div. 1 1980), plaintiff alleged that he was dismissed by the air-
line for his union organizing activities. Id. at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724. He claimed that
company charges that he had committed theft, left his work area without authorization
and threatened a fellow employee were false charges hiding its true motives. Id. Two
issues were present in Cleary: the effects of plaintiff's longevity with the company and
the effects of the expressed policy of the company, set forth in its Regulation 135-4, on
procedures relating to employee grievances and discharge. Id. Cleary had been employed
for 18 years. The court reasoned that termination without cause after such a long period
of time offended the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in
all contracts. The company's written policy adopting specific procedures for adjudicating
employee disputes compelled the conclusion that the employer had recognized its re-
sponsibility to engage in good faith and fair dealing rather than in arbitrary conduct. Id.
The court held that "the longevity of the employee's service, together with the expressed
policy of the employer, [operated] as a form of estoppel, precluding any discharge of
such an employee without good cause." Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
In 1980, the Michigan Supreme Court took a major step in recognizing the rights of
employees hired for indefinite terms to be protected against wrongful discharge. Tous-
saint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980),
involved a middle management employee who had been dismissed from his job after five
years. Id. at 595, 292 N.W.2d at 883. Toussaint had inquired about security when inter-
viewing for the job. Id. at 612, 292 N.W.2d at 891. The court reinstated the trial court's
verdict for Toussaint, id. at 625, 292 N.W.2d at 897, who claimed that oral representa-
tions had been made to him indicating that he would not be discharged as long as he
performed his job properly. Id. at 597, 292 N.W.2d at 884. In addition, he had been given
a Blue Cross personnel policy manual that further assured him that any employee who
had completed his probationary period would be released for just cause only. Id. at 597-
98, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
Blue Cross defended the firing by arguing that when an employment was for an
indefinite period, a distinct and separate consideration was necessary to limit the em-
ployer's right to fire to just cause only. Id. at 599, 292 N.W.2d at 885. It contended
further that such an agreement by an employer, there being no mutuality of obligation,
would fail for lack of consideration. Id. The court rejected these arguments, id. at 600,
292 N.W.2d at 885, and held that an employer's express agreement to terminate only for
cause or statements of company policy and procedure to that effect could give rise to
rights enforceable in contract. Id. at 610, 292 N.W.2d at 890.
92. Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 60, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1979), afl'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed,
51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980).
93. 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70
A.D.2d 603, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d
1028 (1979).
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AT&T "Code of Conduct" which he claimed established the
only grounds on which his employment could be terminated."'
Yet the plaintiff could cite no case to support his claim that the
company manual constituted a contract of employment for a
definite term.'5 Although the code of conduct governed some
conditions of employment, the court concluded that it was de-
fective as an enforceable employment agreement because it did
not contain all the necessary terms of employment, such as the
duties of the particular position, the length of employment and
terms of compensation."
Relying on Chin as authority, the trial court, in Edwards v.
Citibank, N.A., 97 dismissed a similar claim by Edwards that va-
rious staff handbooks and manuals given him by Citibank com-
prised a written employment contract. 8 Edwards conceded that
he had no formal contract or fixed term of employment, but con-
tended that these policy guidelines limited Citibank's power to
discharge him to just cause even though he was free to terminate
at will." The court rejected his contention as utterly lacking in
mutuality.100 The manuals did not constitute a written employ-
ment contract because they did "not exclusively and completely
define the terms and conditions of employment, its duration or
the rate of compensation, i.e., all the essential elements of a con-
tract of employment.' ' 01
III. Factual Background
A. The Facts of Weiner
When Walton Weiner left his job with another publisher in
94. Id. at 1072, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739. Besides lacking the essential terms of employ-
ment, such documents by their nature are typically not signed by the defendant, a condi-
tion necessary to holding a party to a contract. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-701(a) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1982).
97. 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), aff'd, 74 A.D.2d
553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433
N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980).
98. Id. at 60, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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1969 to join McGraw-Hill," 2 his primary objectives were security
and advancement."' 3 Weiner received assurances during his pre-
employment interview that as long as his performance was satis-
factory his job would be secure.10 4 The McGraw-Hill employee
handbook, given to him when he was hired, stated that he could
be dismissed for just cause only.105 In addition, Weiner signed an
application form which stated that he had agreed to be bound
by the terms of the handbook. 06 Several representatives of Mc-
Graw-Hill also signed the form,0 7 but the effect of their signa-
tures was later to become a source of disagreement between the
parties to the action."'
For eight years Weiner did advance with McGraw-Hill.10 9 In
1977, however, he was fired for what McGraw-Hill called "lack
of application."110 Believing that he had been fired because of a
dispute with his supervisor 1 and that the representations made
by McGraw-Hill in its handbook were binding, Weiner sued Mc-
Graw-Hill. 1 2
Weiner's suit alleged three causes of action: breach of con-
102. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 460-61, 443 N.E.2d 441, 442, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193, 194 (1982).
103. Weiner's Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Record at 60,
Weiner.
104. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d at 460, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 194.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 461, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
108. The form Weiner signed stated that his "employment by McGraw-Hill, Inc.
would be subject to the provisions set forth in the McGraw-Hill Employee Handbook on
Personnel Policies & Procedures. . . ." Plaintiff's Exhibit A, Employment Application,
Record at 66A, Weiner. Weiner was required to sign directly below the statement: "I
HAVE READ THE ABOVE PARAGRAPH, UNDERSTAND ITS IMPORTANCE
AND EFFECT UPON MY EMPLOYMENT, AND ACCEPT THE SAME AS CONDI-
TIONS OF MY EMPLOYMENT BY McGRAW-HILL, INC." Id. About two-thirds of
the way down the page is a solid line below which the employee is told not to write. In
this section are lines for the signatures of the interviewer and the person approving the
hiring. There is another space designated "Additional Approval." d. It is unclear from
the form whether the McGraw-Hill signatures relate to the company manual or in any-
way bind McGraw-Hill.
109. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d at 461, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 195.
110. Id.
111. Weiner's Verified Complaint, Record at 17-18, Weiner.
112. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d at 461, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 195.
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tract, intentional interference with contract rights and wrongful
inducement of breach of contract." 3 Weiner joined his supervi-
sor as a defendant in the second and third causes of action. 
11
McGraw-Hill moved to dismiss all three causes of action under
CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (7).115 Supreme court, at special term, in-
terpreted the second cause of action as an allegation of a prima
facie tort."' Since an essential element, a purely malicious mo-
tive, had not been pleaded adequately and because there was
economic justification for the firing, the cause of action was dis-
missed.1 17 The third cause of action, also interpreted as one in
tort, was dismissed for insufficiency "' because it was against
Weiner's supervisor, an officer of McGraw-Hill, and such a claim
was not available against the officers of a party to a contract. " 9
The supreme court refused, however, to dismiss Weiner's first
cause of action for breach of contract. 20 It noted that not only
had Weiner been given a company handbook saying that he
would be discharged for just cause only, but he had been re-
quired to sign a statement on a job application form, as did
agents of the company, stating that he would be bound by the
provisions set forth in the handbook. 2' The court reasoned that
the existence of a written and signed statement removed the bar
of the statute of frauds' 22 and that Edwards v. Citibank, N.A.,1 2 3
113. McGraw-Hill's Statement Pursuant to CPLR 5531, Record at 1, Weiner.
114. Weiner's Verified Complaint, Record at 16, 19, Weiner.
115. Memorandum Opinion, Record at 6, Weiner. CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (7) read as
follows:
Rule 3211. Motion to Dismiss
(a) Motion to dismiss cause of action. A party may move for judgment dis-
missing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that:
5. the cause of action may not be maintained because of ... statute of frauds;
or...
7. the pleading fails to state a cause of action ....
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 3211 (McKinney 1970).
116. Memorandum Opinion, Record at 7, Weiner.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 8.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id. at 6. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 6.
123. 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), aff'd, 74
1983]
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where the plaintiff had been given a similar handbook but had
signed no such statement, was not controlling. 24
B. The Appellate Division
1. The arguments
McGraw-Hill appealed the court's denial of its motion to
dismiss the first complaint.125 It argued that the court had mis-
construed the law, 126 its order being in conflict with Edwards2 7
and Marinzulich"28 which had declared that personnel manuals
were not employment contracts.1"9 It also argued that the hand-
book was not an employment contract since it did not set forth
the necessary terms and conditions of employment." 0 McGraw-
Hill also contended that the section of the application form that
Weiner signed binding him to the terms of the handbook had
not been signed by a company representative."' According to
McGraw-Hill the only company signatures on the form were in
other sections, unrelated to Weiner's signature and to the hand-
book.' 32 McGraw-Hill argued in the alternative that the lack of a
specified term of years made the contract unenforceable even if
signed."
Weiner's main points on appeal were that the handbook and
A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d
400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980).
124. Memorandum Opinion, Record at 7, Weiner.
125. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 83 A.D.2d 810, 442 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1st Dep't 1981)
(mem.), rev'd, 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
126. McGraw-Hill's Brief at 3, Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 83 A.D.2d 810, 442
N.Y.S.2d 11.
127. Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County), affd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d
875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980).
128. Marinzulich v. National Bank of N. Am., N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1979, at 10, col. 2
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, May 8, 1979), affd, 73 A.D.2d 886, 423 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't
1980).
129. McGraw-Hill's Brief at 7, Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 83 A.D.2d 810, 442
N.Y.S.2d 11.
130. Id. at 7, 8.
131. Id. at 8, 9.
132. Id. at 9. See supra note 108.
133. McGraw-Hill's Brief at 9, Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 83 A.D.2d 810, 442
N.Y.S.2d 11.
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application form should be read together to form a contract, 1 '
that the signatures by him and McGraw-Hill on the application
form bound each to the terms of the handbook, 3 5 and finally
that because McGraw-Hill's intent to be bound or not bound
was irrelevant, it should be estopped from raising the defense of
the statute of frauds."' Weiner believed his case was distin-
guishable from those cited by McGraw-Hill in which neither em-
ployer nor employee signed statements agreeing to bind them-
selves to the terms of a policy manual.137 Unlike the employers
in the cited cases, Weiner argued, McGraw-Hill by its own con-
duct had placed a greater significance on its handbook and
therefore could not logically argue that it was a mere policy
guideline.13 8
2. Opinion
In a brief opinion the appellate division reversed special
term's denial of McGraw-Hill's motion to dismiss the first cause
of action.'" The court reasoned that although both employer
and employee had signed the employment application form it
never rose to the level of a written employment contract " 0 be-
cause it failed to state the critical terms of Weiner's employ-
ment."' Furthermore, the court noted that McGraw-Hill could
unilaterally amend or withdraw the provisions of the handbook
at any time." 2 Weiner could not assert that while he was free to
terminate at any time, McGraw-Hill could terminate only for
just cause," 3 since his employment was at will and "he could be
134. Weiner's Brief at 7, Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 83 A.D.2d 810, 442 N.Y.S.2d
11.
135. Id. at 4.
136. Id. at 7.
137. Id. at 9.
138. Id. at 10.
139. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 83 A.D.2d at 811, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 12. Weiner did
not appeal the dismissal of his second and third causes of action. Id. at 810, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 11.
140. Id. at 810-11, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12. The appellate division did not discuss the
issue of whether the McGraw-Hill signatures pertained to the same subject as Weiner's,
i.e., agreement to be bound by to the terms of the handbook.
141. Id. at 811, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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terminated at any time and for any or no reason.
IV. The Court of Appeals' Decision
A. The Majority Opinion
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the record con-
tained "sufficient evidence of a contract and a breach to sustain
a cause of action.' 45 Before discussing Weiner's contract cause
of action, however, the court observed that the parties had sup-
plemented the contract issue with arguments directed to "such
legal formulations as 'abusive discharge', 'implied promise of fair
treatment' and 'good faith', which some courts have applied...
to overcome what they conceived to be the harsh effect of inflex-
ibly strict enforcement of at-will employment agree-
ments .... " 4' The court found it unnecessary to address these
alternative theories, however, because it was allowing Weiner to
proceed under his contract cause of action. 47
Addressing the availability of a contract cause of action, the
court summarily disposed of the statute of frauds issue.' 8 It
stated that "the agreement between Weiner and McGraw-Hill,
whether terminable at will or only for just cause [was] not one
which, 'by its terms', could not [have been] performed within
one year and, therefore, [was not] .. .barred.' 49
Dealing with the substance of the complaint, the court ob-
served that the fact that Weiner was free to quit at any time was
inconclusive of an employment at will.15 e The court determined
that McGraw-Hill's contention, that it was also free to fire Wei-
ner at anytime, was based on the theory of mutuality of obliga-
144. Id. The dissent believed that an employee was entitled to rely on the policy
manual to his detriment and that the employer should be equitably estopped from acting
contrary to its terms. Id. (Kupferman, J., dissenting) (mem.).
145. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465, 443 N.E.2d 441, 445, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982). Judge Fuchsberg wrote the majority opinion in which Chief
Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones and Meyer concurred. Judge Wachtler wrote the
dissenting opinion in which Judge Gabrielli concurred.
146. Id. at 462, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
147. Id. The court noted that it was dealing only with the breach of contract cause
of action since Weiner did not appeal the dismissal of his two tort causes of action. Id. at
461 n.2, 443 N.E.2d at 443 n.2, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195 n.2.
148. Id. at 463, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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tion. 151 Mutuality in the sense of requiring such reciprocity, the
court declared, is not always essential to the formation of a
binding contract, although the presence of consideration is a
fundamental requisite.1 52 The court cited several New York
cases standing for the principle that consideration need not ben-
efit the promisor as long as the promisee suffer some detri-
ment.15 3 The court also quoted from Corbin on consideraton in
an employment context:
[I]f the employer made a promise, either express or implied, not
only to pay for the service but also that the employment should
continue for a period of time that is either definite or capable of
being determined, that employment is not terminable by him "at
will" after the employee has begun or rendered some of the re-
quested service or has given any other consideration .... This is
true even though the employee has made no return promise and
has retained the power and legal privilege of terminating the em-
ployment "at will." The employer's promise is supported by the
service that has been begun or rendered or by the other executed
consideration .... 154
Applying these principles of consideraton to the facts of
Weiner, the court held that the record contained "sufficient evi-
dence of a contract and a breach to sustain a cause of action.' 55
It mentioned several factors which together formulated a ques-
tion for trial. Specifically, McGraw-Hill had used the promise of
job security, which was incorporated into its handbook, to in-
duce Weiner to leave his former job. Furthermore, after joining
McGraw-Hill, Weiner, relying on these assurances, turned down
other offers of employment. Finally, when Weiner considered
firing certain subordinates, his supervisors told him that em-
151. Id. at 463-64, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
152. Id. at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
153. Id. at 464-65, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197 (citing Holt v.
Feigenbaum, 52 N.Y.2d 291, 299, 419 N.E.2d 332, 336, 437 N.Y.S.2d 654, 658 (1981)
(modern concept of consideration includes both benefit to the promisor and detriment to
the promisee); Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 545, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (1891) ("It is
enough that something is promised, done, forborne or suffered by the party to whom the
promise is made as consideration for the promise made to him")).
154. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 197 (quoting IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTs § 152, at 14 (1963)).
155. Id. at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
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ployees could be fired for just cause only.1"6
As the court articulated it, the question for trial was
whether McGraw-Hill was "bound to a promise not to discharge
plaintiff without just and sufficient cause and an opportunity for
rehabilitation. ' 157 The court concluded by cautioning the trial
court that the at-will rule as adopted in Martin v. New York
Life Insurance Co. 158 was merely a rebuttable presumption.159
"[T]he trier of facts [would] have to consider the 'course of con-
duct' of the parties, 'including their writings' and their antece-
dent negotiations.' 60 It would not be McGraw-Hill's "subjective
intent, nor 'any single act, phrase or other expression', but 'the
totality of all of these, given the attendant circumstances, the
situation of the parties, and the objectives they were striving to
attain', which [would] control."' 61
B. The Dissent
The dissent in Weiner argued that Martin v. New York Life
Insurance Co. 162 and almost a century of New York common law
stood for the proposition that "absent some form of contractual
agreement between an employee and employer establishing a
durational period, the employment is presumed terminable at
the will of either party ... "163 The dissent reasoned that the
presumption had not been rebutted in Weiner since it believed
that as a matter of law no language contained in either the
handbook or the employment application, read separately or to-
gether, evidenced an intent by the defendant to be bound by the
contents of the handbook. 16 4 The dissent construed the company
156. Id. at 465-66, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197. Weiner also claimed that
he was told that "if he did not proceed in accordance with the strict procedures set forth
in the handbook, McGraw-Hill would be liable for legal action." Id. at 466, 443 N.E.2d at
445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
157. Id.
158. 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
159. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d at 466, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 198.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 466-67, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
162. 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
163. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 198 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
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handbook as a document that merely espoused internal policy
guidelines'6 5 which could be unilaterally amended or with-
drawn. 6 Furthermore, according to the dissent, the application
form did not spell out the critical terms of plaintiff's employ-
ment, the type of work, salary or duration.' 7 The dissent dis-
puted the plaintiff's contention that McGraw-Hill had also
signed the application form in such a way as to bind itself to the
terms of the handbook, noting:
It is evident from the layout of the form ... that the signatures
of the company officials were not part of the application and re-
present no contractual exchange between plaintiff and defendant.
Those signatures and the statement that plaintiff [had been] em-
ployed [were], rather, nothing more than a memorialization of the
hiring event for internal record keeping purposes."
The dissent concluded by stating that public policy weighed
against elevating such documents to the level of contracts."69
Making it more difficult for a business to dismiss an unsatisfac-
tory employee, it argued, would create an unfavorable business
climate and encourage business and industry to move out of the
state.
70
V. Analysis
Aggrieved ex-employees in New York who believe they have
been unjustly fired have had little success in bringing causes of
action sounding in tort.'7 ' Although New York courts have ex-
165. Id. at 468, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
The dissent went on to observe, however, that a section of the application form cap-
tioned "Record of Employment" was filled in to indicate that Weiner was employed as a
senior copywriter at a salary of $15,000 per year. 'Id. at 468, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 468, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 468-69, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
The dissent seemed to be responding to the majority's mention of policy considerations
leading to agitation for modification of the at-will rule to provide greater job security.
170. Id. at 469, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
171. See, e.g., Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal
denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979); Marinzulich v. National Bank of N.
Am., N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1979, at 10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, May 8, 1979), afl'd, 73
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pressed a willingness to recognize the tort of abusive discharge
given the proper circumstances, 172 they have not yet done so or
indicated exactly what those circumstances are. Plaintiffs alleg-
ing a prima facie tort have rarely been able to establish the ex-
clusive motive of malice that is a necessary element of that
tort. 173
Discharged employees have been equally unsuccessful in ar-
guing breach of contract.' 74 Although the effect of the one-year
provision of the statute of frauds on employment contracts in
New York is unclear, it has sometimes been a bar to the plead-
ing of an oral contract of permanent employment.'75 As a further
impediment, New York courts have been unreceptive to recog-
nizing company documents as creating contractual rights. 76
The court of appeals, in allowing Weiner to go to trial on his
breach of contract cause of action, reached the correct decision
but failed to justify adequately its reasons for breaking with a
century of precedent or to distinguish the case sufficiently from
conflicting cases. The court's offhand dismissal of the statute of
frauds issue is also troubling. Nevertheless, its conclusion that
Weiner may have provided adequate consideration in the form
of detrimental reliance to make binding McGraw-Hill's promise
A.D. 2d 886, 423 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't 1980).
172. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 171.
173. See, e.g., Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1074, 410
N.Y.S.2d 737, 740 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160
(1st Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979). See supra notes
58-71 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 824 (E.D.N.Y. 1980);
Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 60, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1979), aff'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51
N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1072-73, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70
A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (lst Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d
1028 (1979).
175. See, e.g., Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 60, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), affd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal
dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980); Savodnik v.
Korvettes, Inc., 488 F.2d 822, 824 (1980). See supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1979), afl'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dis-
missed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980); Chin v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70
A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d
1028 (1979). See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
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to discharge for just cause only is correct. The court's apparent
reliance on the principle of equitable estoppel-implying that
McGraw-Hill, having by its own words and actions led Weiner to
believe that his employment was not at will, should be estopped
from asserting that it was-is also correct.
The court's interpretation of the statute of frauds, allowing
an unwritten contract which has any chance of being performed
within a year to fall outside the statute's scope, was extremely
narrow. Its interpretation of Weiner's rights, however, was
vague, the court stating merely that the agreement "whether ter-
minable at will or only for just cause [was] not one which, 'by its
terms,' could not [have been] performed within one
year. .... 177 The court's interpretation conflicts with prior
cases. For instance, if either side was free to terminate at any
time for any reason, according to Blake v. Voight,17 the agree-
ment definitely was capable of performance within a year. Wei-
ner's case, however, rested on his contention that McGraw-Hill
was not free to terminate for any reason but for just cause only.
If Weiner alone could terminate within a year, then, under Har-
ris v. Home Indemnity Co.,1 79 the defendant's liability endured
indefinitely, it being "illusory, from the point of view of defen-
dant, to consider the contract terminable or performable within
one year."1 10 If McGraw-Hill could terminate for just cause only,
then under the reasoning of Belfert v. Peoples Planning Corp. of
America,' this would be destruction of the contract, not per-
formance or termination."8 2 Moreover, from all indications it is
apparent that neither Weiner nor McGraw-Hill intended the
agreement to be completed within a year and Weiner did in fact
remain employed for eight years.
While the court of appeals relied on its interpretation of the
agreement as being capable of performance within a year to
177. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 463, 443 N.E.2d 441, 444, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193, 196 (quoting N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701(a)(1) (McKinney 1978)).
178. 134 N.Y. 69, 31 N.E. 256 (1892).
179. 6 A.D.2d 861, 175 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1st Dep't 1958).
180. Id. at 861, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
181. 22 Misc. 2d 753, 199 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959), afi'd, 11
A.D.2d 760, 202 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1st Dep't 1960), a/I'd, 11 N.Y.2d 755, 181 N.E.2d 630, 226
N.Y.S.2d 693 (1962).
182. Id. at 755-56, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
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avoid the bar of the statute of frauds, special term had taken a
different approach. Apparently conceding that the agreement
could not be completed within a year and must therefore be in
writing, special term focused on the application form which had
been signed by Weiner and representatives of McGraw-Hill. It
thus distinguished the case from Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 8'
where the employee had received a similar handbook,' " con-
cluding that Edwards apparently had not signed a statement
binding himself to its contents.1 5 To make an agreement bind-
ing, however, the writings must be signed by the party to be
bound. 8 6 Although the court of appeals mentioned special
term's finding that Weiner had signed such a statement, 8 7 it did
not deal with the issue of whether McGraw-Hill had signed it in
such a manner as to make it binding upon itself. As the dissent
correctly pointed out, it was "evident from the layout of the [ap-
plication] form, then, that the signatures of the company offi-
cials were not part of the application and represent no contrac-
tual exchange between plaintiff and defendant." 88 In its sole
reference to the McGraw-Hill signatures, the majority referred
to them as only written approval to the engagement of Weiner's
services. 89 It was remiss in not dealing with the disputed issue
of whether those signatures bound McGraw-Hill to the terms of
the handbook. It seems clear that while Weiner was agreeing to
be bound by the terms of the company handbook, the McGraw-
Hill signatures merely indicated approval of such things as his
hiring, his starting salary and position.
The application form and company handbook, although
they could properly be read together, 90 then, were not sufficient
183. 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), affd, 74
A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d
400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980).
184. Id. at 60, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
185. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 461, 443 N.E.2d 441, 443, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193, 195.
186. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (a) (McKinney 1978).
187. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d at 461, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 195.
188. Id. at 468, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 461, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
190. Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 305 N.Y. 48, 55, 110 N.E.2d 551, 554
(1953).
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to create a binding contract between Weiner and McGraw-Hill.
The court was correct, however, in allowing Weiner's breach of
contract cause of action to go forward. The theories of detrimen-
tal reliance as a form of consideration and of equitable estoppel
were sufficient to protect Weiner from termination except for
just cause. Although the handbook and application form did not
rise to the level of a contract, they created a reasonable reliance
by plaintiff that he could not be discharged without cause. Ac-
cording to plaintiff's version of the facts, he had given up ac-
crued fringe benefits and a proferred salary increase by his for-
mer employer when he joined McGraw-Hill and since then he
had routinely rejected other offers of employment. Furthermore,
under the facts as alleged, McGraw-Hill went so far by its own
actions and statements to dispell the notion that the employ-
ment was at will that it should be estopped from asserting that
it was. Again according to plaintiff, Weiner had told McGraw-
Hill that job security was essential to him.'91 Not only had com-
pany representatives assured him that he would have it,'92 but
the company handbook made the same promise.'" Weiner
signed an application form agreeing to be bound by the terms of
the handbook. 194 Regardless of whether the application form was
signed by defendant in such a manner as to make it binding on
it, the fact that McGraw-Hill required Weiner to sign it must
have impressed upon him the importance of the terms of the
handbook with which he was promising to comply.
Finally, when Weiner considered firing certain subordinates
he was warned to proceed in strict compliance with the company
handbook. 9 ' Although Weiner may not have had a formal con-
tract with McGraw-Hill as a result of the handbook, he was cer-
tainly justified in believing its representations that he could be
fired for just cause only. An employer should not be permitted
to go to such lengths to induce an employee to join it with the
promise of job security only to assert that it is not bound by any
191. Weiner's Brief at 8, Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 83 A.D.2d 810, 442 N.Y.S.2d
11.
192. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d at 460, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 194.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 466, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
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of its oral or written representations.
The court wisely did not rule on the tort issues raised. Wei-
ner did not appeal special term's order dismissing his second
and third causes of action. Had he appealed, however, it is un-
likely that he would have been able to show the absence of busi-
ness motives necessary to allege a prima facie tort. Furthermore,
the New York courts have long avoided specifically defining
what allegations are necessary for the tort of abusive discharge.
There were no allegations that Weiner was fired for engaging in
the type of activities which have been recognized as being pro-
tected as a matter of public policy.
VI. Conclusion
The employment-at-will doctrine, which allows an employer
to fire an employee at will, has generally been rigidly adhered to
by New York courts. Disgruntled, discharged employees have
thus been unsuccessful in advancing tort and contract theories
of liability which would support claims against their employers
arising from their terminations. In Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
the plaintiff again presented the New York courts an opportu-
nity to join other states in permitting a basis for liability in con-
tract. The New York Court of Appeals modified the at-will rule
by allowing Weiner to argue that his employer, by its words and
actions, had limited its freedom to fire him in what would other-
wise have been an employment-at-will situation.
The decision appears to mark a significant development in
the law affecting employment practices in New York. A trial on
the merits is now indicated in situations where previously an ag-
grieved employee would have had his case dismissed. Just how
significant a change this represents may depend in part, how-
ever, on how Weiner fares at trial.196 Based on the facts as
presented, his case appears to be a strong one on the merits. If
he cannot meet the burden of establishing a contractual right to
be fired for just cause only, it is difficult to imagine what would
be necessary to do so.
196. To prevail at trial, however, Weiner presumably will have to show not only that
McGraw-Hill's representations created contractual rights but that he relied on such rep-
resentations and that he was not in fact fired for just cause, i.e., "lack of application," as
McGraw-Hill claimed.
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The Weiner holding appears to be a narrow one in that it
does not abandon the employment-at-will rule. Management's
right to fire an incompetent employee remains. More impor-
tantly, management's right to fire an employee without just
cause also appears to survive the Weiner decision. Only when an
employer, by his own statements and actions, goes as far as Mc-
Graw-Hill apparently did in assuring an employee that his em-
ployment is not at will, will it be estopped from later asserting
that it was.
Nevertheless, in spite of its possible practical limitation and
narrow holding, Weiner marks a significant development in the
law affecting employment practices in New York. Employers,
fearing similar suits, will undoubtly scrutinize not only their re-
cruitment practices but other employment practices to safeguard
against creating unintended contractual rights.197
Although the Weiner holding itself is narrow, there are indi-
cations that further erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine
is inevitable. 198 The court in Weiner pointed to increasing criti-
cism of the doctrine for its harsh effects and to the trend toward
recognizing causes of action sounding in both tort and contract.
Mindful that such a further modification of the employment-at-
will rule looms, employers undoubtedly will temper their actions
to prevent discharged employees from prevailing in such suits if
and when the tort is recognized. Thus management now has sev-
eral additional legal principles to consider before making what
previously would have been simply a business decision.
Ann Bickford
197. One almost certain result of Weiner will be that employers will revise their
employee handbooks to avoid such promises of continued employment in the absence of
just cause for dismissal.
198. Although lower courts in New York have indicated their willingness to recog-
nize the tort of abusive discharge, the court of appeals does not appear to be ready to do
so. Recently, in Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., No. 83-35, slip op. (N.Y. Ct.
App. Mar. 29, 1983), a case involving the discharge of a company assistant treasurer who
had called management's attention to deviations from its internal accounting procedures,
the court concluded that recognition of the tort of abusive discharge should be left to the
legislature. Id. at 7, 8.
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